

Digital resistance

Understanding perceptions of online spaces and tools in political activism in Myanmar

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K4DM was launched in 2017 by Global Affairs Canada and IDRC. It nurtures a new generation of young actors to promote inclusion, gender equality, respect for diversity, and prosperity for all in Myanmar. Making use of online courses, fellowships and research on digital spaces, the initiative supports diverse students and researchers primarily in the Myanmar diaspora and research institutions outside the country.



Acronyms

AA – Arakan Army

EROs – Ethnic Resistance Organizations

KIA – Kachin Independence Army

LPDFs – Local People’s Defence Forces

MNDAA – Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army

MOPFI – Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment

NUCC – National Unity Consultative Council

NUG – National Unity Government

PDFs – People’s Defence Forces

SAC – State Administration Council

VPN – Virtual Private Network

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Executive summary

Since the military coup in Myanmar on February 1, 2021, the State Administration Council (SAC) has employed extensive measures to control digital spaces, aiming to suppress revolutionary movements. This includes internet shutdowns, social media restrictions, and the imposition of surveillance laws, which have instilled fear and led to widespread self-censorship among citizens. Despite these efforts, digital platforms continue to serve as vital tools for political engagement, awareness-building, and participation in the Spring Revolution.

This report synthesizes qualitative and empirical findings to assess the impact of digital repression on political participation and public perception. The analysis identifies key challenges, such as digital fatigue, surveillance concerns, and regulatory censorship, which have hindered activism. However, it also highlights opportunities for leveraging digital spaces more effectively in future political campaigns.

The report reveals that higher digital engagement often reduces activism due to fatigue and slacktivism, while trust in credible sources strongly boosts participation and donations. Regulatory censorship, while suppressing direct activism, can spark resistance and increase financial support, but excessive repression ultimately limits engagement. Awareness of digital rights and privacy risks encourages donations but leads to self-censorship, reducing overall activism.

In response to these challenges, the report offers several policy recommendations to strengthen digital activism.

To sustain and strengthen Myanmar's revolutionary movement, organizations must enhance structural support, reduce reliance on voluntary labour, and establish long-term financial stability. Fundraising strategies should be revised to ensure secure, transparent contributions while adapting to digital platforms. Sustainable revenue models, including taxation in controlled areas, are essential to reduce dependency on public donations.

Building trust and credibility requires strategic media engagement to counter misinformation and skepticism. Inclusive public participation must be prioritized by creating meaningful engagement platforms beyond passive consumption. Additionally, activists and revolution forces should adopt stronger digital security measures to mitigate surveillance risks and safeguard online activities.

Despite the SAC's efforts to stifle political movements, digital platforms remain a crucial tool for resistance. With strategic policy interventions, digital activism can continue to play a significant role in Myanmar's political landscape, driving the momentum of the Spring Revolution forward and overcoming the barriers imposed by the regime.

Introduction

Myanmar's recent political trajectory has highlighted the powerful role of digital tools in shaping and sustaining political movements. This research explores the complex relationship between digital tools and political activism in Myanmar, examining how these platforms influence, catalyze, and support social and political transformations. Following the 2021 military coup, digital activism, especially on platforms like Facebook, became instrumental in the Spring Revolution, mobilizing citizens and spreading awareness on a national and global scale. The internet served not only as an organizing tool but also as a critical channel for disseminating information amid government restrictions on traditional media.

One of the most prominent examples of digital activism was the surge in "Social Punishments," a movement that used social media to identify and isolate individuals and businesses linked to the military regime. Campaigns also emerged advocating for the boycott of military-affiliated products and services, and these online efforts gathered substantial momentum. An example of such digital-driven action involved Myanmar Plaza, one of Yangon's most popular shopping centers. After security personnel at the plaza used force against political activists during a flash mob protest, social media erupted in a call to boycott the plaza (Nikkei Asia, 2022). This boycott, amplified by a flood of criticism online, led to a sustained six-month closure of the shopping center. The shutdown impacted many businesses within the plaza, resulting in financial strain and economic hardship for business owners and employees who were left without stable sources of income.

In addition to boycotts, symbolic acts of resistance, such as the "Flower Strike," gained traction (Frontier Myanmar, 2021). On the birthday of detained State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, many people wore flowers, a reference to her signature look, and posted photos on social media as a display of solidarity. Other notable digital-led actions included "Silent Strike" on key dates of the revolution, during which citizens engaged in acts of nonviolent protest by collectively withdrawing from public spaces and work, marking these moments of resistance with social media updates.

These movements highlight ongoing public solidarity against the military regime, with digital platforms crucial for organization and resistance. Social media remains the key tool for nationwide communication, mobilizing support and uniting opposition. This study examines the evolving role of digital activism in Myanmar's ongoing fight for change.

Literature review

This literature review examines the role of social media in facilitating political participation, mobilizing activism, and impacting governance in various contexts, focusing on its transformative influence across regions, including Myanmar. It also explores how digital platforms have empowered individuals to engage in political movements, and the complex dynamics they introduce for regimes attempting to maintain control.

The rapid adoption of online platforms has transformed political participation, allowing individuals to voice opinions and engage in activism with reduced personal risk (Bronstein, 2011). Social media's potential in mobilizing political movements has been evident in pivotal events like the Arab Spring, where platforms enabled the swift dissemination of information and the rallying of support for change. Hashtags like “#Bouazizi” in Tunisia symbolized collective resistance and unified diverse groups, contributing to the Jasmine Revolution, which challenged longstanding Middle Eastern and North African regimes. By reframing protest organizations from physical to digital model, social media mitigated risks and encouraged hesitant individuals to participate, ultimately reshaping political mobilization frameworks previously grounded solely in physical action (Blas, 2018).

Research shows that digital media affects political engagement variably, moderated by factors like political interest and activity type. Bimber et al. (2014) found that digital media engagement encourages political discussions among those with lower political interest and can enhance voting engagement. However, for elite-directed acts like donating or campaigning, political interest yields mixed effects. Thus, while digital media opens avenues for political conversation, the impact on traditional engagement forms is nuanced, showing that motivation and media type can shape political behavior.

In developing countries, where traditional political structures may limit public engagement, social media has proven to be a critical tool for political expression. Alodat et al. (2023) investigated the impact of social media on political involvement among Jordanian youth, finding that social media usage significantly enhances political participation. The study highlighted gender as a moderating factor, with male youth participating more actively. Gender differences influenced the frequency and purpose of social media usage, underscoring the need for inclusive strategies to promote engagement across demographics.

Political engagement through social media can be categorized into three types: passive exposure to political content, digital citizenship activities, and political participation aimed at influencing others or achieving political change (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2021). This framework reveals that online political engagement is not only about influencing policy but also about shaping public opinion and encouraging civic discourse, suggesting that online platforms provide a foundation for future influence cycles.

While social media can enhance democratic engagement, especially among young people, Matthes (2022) pointed out the paradox of social media's impact on political participation. In the U.S., Germany, Switzerland, and Japan, social media use among young people has soared, but voter turnout gaps between younger and older generations remain largely unchanged. This “Social Media Political Participation Paradox” suggests that the entertainment focus of social media may distract young adults from political involvement, complicating the notion that social media inherently mobilizes civic action.

Kim and Chen (2016) examined the influence of social media use on online political participation, noting that blogs and social networking sites positively correlate with political activity online. Exposure to similar viewpoints (like-minded perspectives) and contrasting views (cross-cutting perspectives) mediates

political engagement, indicating that the diversity of information encountered affects individuals' engagement. Exposure to like-minded opinions via blogs encourages participation, while cross-cutting views on social networking sites foster broader engagement by challenging individuals to think critically. This suggests that social media's capacity to mobilize varies based on the type of information users encounter and the interaction dynamics of each platform.

Social media's role as an equalizer, giving a voice to marginalized individuals, also presents risks. Olaniran and Williams (2020) argued that social networks can be manipulated to spread propaganda, amplify disruptive ideologies, and distort civic engagement. In contexts where governments fear losing control, social media platforms may become battlegrounds for influence, shaping public opinion and civic participation. This underscores the need for caution and oversight to prevent misinformation and maintain democracy-enhancing potential.

In Indonesia, social media has reshaped political engagement by creating a space for discussion, debate, and public expression. Sianturi (2024) noted that social media has facilitated rapid access to political information in Indonesia, enabled open discourse on political issues, and fostered public participation. Through its role in providing accessible information and debate platforms, social media has heightened public engagement in civic matters, demonstrating its potential as a democratizing force, particularly in nations where traditional political engagement may be limited.

Fittingly, the Facebook platform, with 22 million users facilitated widespread hate speech and misinformation, primarily targeting the Rohingya Muslim minority in Myanmar. Myanmar's military has long used propaganda to portray the Rohingya as foreign invaders, denying their historical presence. Facebook's entry into Myanmar in 2010 coincided with this politically charged environment. Despite its rapid user growth, the platform was inadequately equipped to manage content in the country. A single employee oversaw Myanmar-specific content, and Facebook's algorithms, designed to maximize user engagement, disproportionately amplified divisive and inflammatory posts. By 2012, senior government officials and influential figures, including Buddhist monk Ashin Wirathu, utilized Facebook to spread anti-Rohingya rhetoric, inciting violence against the community. In 2017, Facebook played a central role in organizing attacks on the Rohingya, leading to over 700,000 refugees fleeing violence classified as genocide. Despite mounting evidence linking Facebook to escalating hate crimes, the company responded sluggishly to warnings from activists and human rights organizations. Its attempts to mitigate harm, such as warning stickers on harmful posts, inadvertently amplified the flagged content due to algorithmic biases (Johnson & Acemoglu, 2023).

Further complicity emerged in 2019 when Facebook banned ethnic organizations such as Arakan Army (AA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), documenting military abuses while accommodating government demands. Myanmar's experience highlights the dangers of unregulated social media in politically fragile contexts. Facebook's failure to curb hate speech underscores the urgent need for accountability and oversight of digital platforms in conflict-prone societies (Johnson & Acemoglu, 2023).

Amid Myanmar's post-coup environment, digital tools have empowered activists while challenging the ruling junta's efforts to maintain control. Jaydn et al. (2023) described how Myanmar's democracy activists have utilized cyber tools such as cryptocurrency, hacktivism, and click-to-donate platforms to resist the military regime. Despite the junta's efforts to restrict the internet and curb digital freedoms,

activists have leveraged app-based payment and communication systems to mobilize resistance, indicating a digital resistance to authoritarian control in a society increasingly reliant on the internet.

Khine (2023) examined the rise of digital authoritarianism in Myanmar, detailing how the regime leverages technology from Russia and China for censorship and surveillance. Measures such as internet blackouts, random phone checks, and elevated data prices have restricted freedom of expression and undermined privacy. This crackdown represents a significant constraint on digital rights, with authorities using indirect censorship to stifle dissent.

Similarly, Thitsar (2024) provided an in-depth look at Facebook's role in Myanmar's polarized landscape, where it functions as both a tool for resistance and a vehicle for military propaganda. The study reveals how the military uses Facebook to monitor dissidents and spread misinformation, while opposition movements use it to coordinate protests and sustain democratic engagement. Facebook's policy shifts, influenced by collaborations with civil society and international allies, underscore the complex interplay between digital governance and political identity. Despite challenges in moderating hate speech, the platform remains critical for political activism and solidarity, highlighting the need for responsible social media management amid political crises.

The Myanmar military has sought to control digital activism through extensive internet regulations. The International Crisis Group (2021) described how internet shutdowns, social media bans, and IP filtering have been employed to restrict mobilization and limit information flow. These measures impede real-time organization and compromise the safety of protestors, underscoring the regime's commitment to stifling dissent by restricting digital freedoms.

Further complicating this struggle, Rao and Atmakuri (2021) discussed how social media companies in Myanmar face challenges balancing freedom of expression with content regulation. Facebook and Twitter (X) have been criticized for failing to adequately address disinformation in Myanmar, similar to their struggles during the 2020 U.S. elections. Oppressive régimes, on one hand, see social media platforms as threats to control, while citizens view them as essential spaces for free expression. Excessive restrictions, including internet shutdowns and law amendments such as The Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (2017), or the "Privacy Law," and the Electronic Transactions Law (2004)—the "ET Law" (Tilleke & Gibbins, 2021) reflect administrative overreach that limits free speech and erodes public trust. As Myanmar's military régime faces growing opposition, digital platforms continue to be spaces of contention, where both resistance and repression are waged.

On social media, Alywyn (2024) suggested that Facebook should enhance account verification for political entities in Myanmar, given the junta's widespread use of fake accounts for misinformation. While Facebook's content takedowns target harmful posts, they risk unintentionally censoring non-harmful content. To address Myanmar's linguistic diversity and low digital literacy, Facebook could improve training for moderators and introduce Myanmar-specific guidelines within its Community Standards to better support credible political content.

In conclusion, this literature reflects a growing understanding of social media's role as a double-edged sword in political participation. While it enables civic engagement, it also introduces risks of manipulation, misinformation, and government repression. In Myanmar, digital tools have empowered democratic movements and amplified citizen voices, even as the military has sought to restrict their influence. Social media has not only reshaped political participation but also introduced new challenges for governance, highlighting the complexities of digital activism in authoritarian contexts.

Research methodology

The research question explores, “How are digital spaces and tools shaping the public political engagement landscape of Myanmar after the 2021 military coup?” Overview of the proposed conceptual framework is described in Figure 1 where public political engagement is observed from the different approaches under the digital spaces and tools.

Qualitative method

We conducted 9 key informant interviews (KII) from September to November 2024, with youth leaders, political event organizers, campaigners, fundraisers, strike leaders, student activists, influencers, reporters (press), scholars, and participants from the general public involved in digital political movements for better understanding and interpretation of quantitative results.

Quantitative method

A total of 739 online participants were surveyed between September and December 2024 using Google Forms in the Myanmar language, with 465 valid responses for data interpretation. The data collection included one pilot test and two surveys conducted through Facebook boosts to achieve a sufficient sample size. The sample population was drawn from the targeted digital population of 23.93 million users (We are Social, 2024). Simple random sampling (Cochran, 1977) was applied, utilizing an internet-based inquiry method. The targeted group of internet users ranged from 13 years old to over 65.


Based on the questions that we collected from the respondents, we gathered the same group of information under each variable for each index. To receive the index which represents each dependent and independent variable, we use normalization methods to improve the performance of the data pattern and to optimize the algorithms and avoid the bias of the large range.

In this study, Public Political Engagement was taken as the dependent variable, while digital space factors such as digital engagement, perceptions of political movements, trust and credibility, regulatory censorship, and awareness of digital rights and privacy served as independent variables. To understand impact on the dependent variable, we examine how independent variables influence the dependent variables by using the multiple regression analysis model. We employed the regression analysis on each dependent variable using the same set of independent and control variables.

The model is: $y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1x_1 + \beta_2x_2 + \beta_3x_3 + \beta_4x_4 + \beta_5x_5 + \beta_ix_i + \varepsilon$

Where y_i is the public political movements (y_1 as the participation in digital movements and activities, y_2 as promoting awareness and sharing information about the Spring Revolution, and y_3 as the contribution money and donations through digital platforms). While x_1 to x_5 are the digital engagement, perceptions of political movements, trust and credibility in information, regulatory censorship, and awareness of digital rights and privacy. Several socio-demographic factors (x_i) are set as control variables to account for potential endogeneity. Details on control variables can be observed in section 5.2 and Appendix 1.

FIGURE 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK



Research limitation and challenges

Given the heightened risks associated with conducting ground surveys for both respondents and enumerators, the team identified online data collection as one of the safest and most viable options for quantitative surveys. Leveraging Facebook's technology effectively is crucial to ensure cost efficiency and maximize outreach for the research. Due to VPN issues in Myanmar, we will engage with our audience for our survey by distributing it through multiple channels. Our primary distribution will be via our Facebook channel. Additionally, we used our Telegram channel and collaborated with admins of popular platform channels to attract respondents and distribute the survey form. This multi-channel approach served as a backup option for respondents facing VPN issues.

From September to December 2024, one pilot test and a two-round online survey were conducted using Facebook boosts. One key finding from the online data collection revealed that people showed a greater preference for small incentives, such as mobile top-ups, over larger incentives like lucky draws. This preference was attributed to the participants' prioritization of the value they place on their time. On the other hand, the research team must stay proactive in several areas to ensure the survey runs smoothly. This includes promptly providing mobile top-up allowances, patiently addressing requests for such allowances, and quickly responding to participants' security concerns. Additionally, the team needs to regularly remind participants not to duplicate their responses in the survey or on the research team's Facebook page posts, messengers and comments.

The team must also recognize the challenges posed by Facebook's algorithm, which does not always function effectively for politically sensitive posts. This makes it difficult to predict the number of respondents, even with substantial expenses such as spending 111 THB per respondent on Facebook

boosting, offering lucky draw incentives, and providing mobile top-up allowances. Since we used an incentive of 2 USD to give every respondent in our survey, some respondents filled out our survey twice or thrice. Therefore, we have to clean our data based on the Phone Number they answered for the top-up.

There are significant risks and barriers to data collection period from September to December 2024, in this research. The SAC has restricted internet access, making it difficult to use VPNs, and there is evidence that over 66.2% of respondents expressed concerns about answering the questions due to fear that the SAC might use the research for investigative purposes. This has created substantial obstacles in reaching the target sample population. Another limitation for researchers is that they cannot use their real identities to distribute the survey through their networks or online platforms, due to the associated risks of being tracked by the SAC. Additionally, the lengthy questionnaire has led to reduced respondent concentration, and feedback from the pilot survey indicated that security concerns are a major factor discouraging participation.

Qualitative analysis

This section explores the perceptions of digital spaces and tools on political activism by analyzing key factors such as digital engagement, perceptions of political movements, trust and credibility in fundraising, regulatory censorship of SAC and awareness of digital rights and public issues. The analysis is based on data collected through 9 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and descriptive data from online surveys. The term "policymakers" refers to the policymaking bodies within revolutionary forces, youth leaders, political event organizers, campaigners, fundraisers, strike leaders, student activists, influencers, reporters (press), scholars, and individuals involved in the Spring Revolution, while the term "public" refers to the general population reflected from the survey results and literature reviews.

Digital engagement

The digital landscape has become a vital tool for engagement and information dissemination in contexts of political upheaval. Despite social media platforms associated with Facebook and Meta being banned since the February 2021 coup in Myanmar, their continued usage highlights both the resilience of the public seeking access to current news and the complexities of information flow in a revolution.

Digital platform, usage frequency and content types

Our recent survey indicates that approximately 90% of respondents favour Facebook as their primary platform, followed by YouTube and Telegram. This data underscores the dependency on these platforms for information, revealing a digital ecosystem where the population remains engaged, albeit through less conventional means.

- **Public perception:** Activities on these platforms reveal significant patterns in daily usage. A majority of users, 55%, engage with digital media for 0-3 hours each day, while 29% allocate between 4-6 hours. Only a smaller segment, 9%, engages for 7-9 hours. This variance in time spent on digital platforms signifies differing levels of interest and access among the population. Engagement with different content types illustrates the public's priorities; a substantial 70% actively read news articles, while 45% engage with videos and 35% with opinion pieces. Notably, memes, often dismissed as trivial, attract attention from 28% of users, suggesting that humour and satire can play significant roles in a revolutionary context by promoting awareness and solidarity.
- **Policymaker perception:** Emerging content forms, particularly opinion pieces and live broadcasts on social media, have captured public interest, reflecting a shift towards more dynamic, engaging communication methods. Such formats provide immediate and personal insights into revolutionary issues, thereby enhancing public involvement and discourse. Interestingly, short illustrations and captivating visual content are particularly effective in reaching younger audiences, facilitating the spread of critical messaging, including fund-raising campaigns. This shift indicates a transformation in how messages are crafted and consumed, emphasizing brevity and impact in communication.

Digital news sources

The reliance on diverse news sources, such as local independent journals, foreign media outlets, and online influencers, reveals the population's approach to garnering information.

- **Public perception:** People interact with these sources with varying degrees of trust, indicating a complex relationship with information that has likely been shaped by the political climate. Although a faction of the population remains disconnected due to social segmentation, evidenced by some prioritizing religious engagements over political updates, there exists a core group deeply committed to the revolutionary cause. This active segment continually consumes news and participates in discourse, demonstrating a pivotal division within the society regarding awareness and engagement with the revolution.
- **Policymaker perception:** Despite the benefits of digital platforms in fostering a sense of connection and encouraging participation in the Spring Revolution, there remains a significant risk of misinformation. The dual nature of these platforms can spread half-truths and unfounded narratives, undermining the revolutionary spirit and causing confusion among the populace. Thus, while digital spaces enable participation and activism for those unable to contribute physically, they also perpetuate challenges in discerning truth from falsehood.

In conclusion, the role of digital platforms in Myanmar's Spring Revolution encapsulates a complex interplay between engagement and misinformation. The resilience of the public, who continue to support the revolution despite censorship, reveals an enduring revolutionary spirit. Digital platforms serve as a conduit for connection and awareness, allowing the public to remain engaged with ongoing events while simultaneously posing challenges that require critical consumption of information. As the revolution progresses, it is imperative to harness the power of these platforms while remaining vigilant against the pitfalls of misinformation.

Perception of political movement

Understanding the perceptions of the ongoing Spring Revolution political movement in Myanmar is essential to comprehending the complexities of modern resistance against authoritarian rule. Since the military coup in February 2021, the people of Myanmar have mobilized in unprecedented ways, blending traditional protest tactics with digital activism. The Spring Revolution has become a defining moment in the country's struggle for democracy, driven not only by on-ground protests and armed revolution but also by extensive use of digital platforms. These platforms have transformed into revolutionary arenas where ideas are shared, narratives are shaped, and global attention is drawn to the cause.

- **Public perception:** Digital platforms play a pivotal role in this movement by enabling real-time communication, fostering decentralized leadership, and amplifying the voices of protesters. Activists, journalists, and everyday citizens use social media to report human rights violations, organize protests, and counter state-sponsored misinformation. The digital space has also become a battlefield where the regime deploys surveillance, internet shutdowns, and propaganda campaigns to suppress dissent. Despite these challenges, the resilience of Myanmar's digital activists demonstrates the transformative potential of technology in modern revolutions.

Exploring how people perceive the Spring Revolution through the lens of digital activism offers a deeper understanding of its societal impact. It highlights the interplay between technological access, political awareness, and participatory democracy. Furthermore, examining these perceptions helps contextualize the broader struggle for freedom and human rights in the digital age. By analyzing how

digital platforms influence individual and collective behavior, we can better appreciate the revolutionary power of online spaces in sustaining resistance, fostering solidarity, and driving social and political change. In this light, studying the Spring Revolution's digital dimension is not only relevant but also imperative for understanding the evolving nature of political activism in the 21st century.

- **Policy maker perception:** To gain deeper insights into the current political movement in Myanmar and the role of digital platforms in fostering revolutionary activities, we conducted Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with fundraisers, policymakers, strike leaders, and student activists actively engaged in the Spring Revolution. These interviews aimed to reflect their diverse perceptions regarding the movement's progress and the impact of digital spaces in interacting with the public. While their views varied based on their specific roles and experiences, they unanimously agreed that digital access and internet connectivity play a crucial role in advancing the revolution. According to them, digital platforms significantly enhance the movement's reach, effectiveness, and efficiency in raising awareness about democracy and mobilizing public support.

Fundraisers highlighted how crowdfunding through online platforms has become a lifeline for sustaining revolutionary activities. With secure digital transactions, they can collect funds from a global diaspora, ensuring financial stability for protests, humanitarian aid, and media campaigns. Similarly, policymakers emphasized the importance of digital spaces for disseminating policies and countering disinformation. In a political environment rife with state-controlled media, social media channels allow alternative voices to be heard, helping to inform and engage both domestic and international audiences.

Strike leaders and student activists shared compelling stories of how digital tools have empowered grassroots organizing. They noted that encrypted messaging apps and social media platforms facilitate instant communication, enabling decentralized protests and reducing the risks of leadership crackdowns. They also acknowledged the dual nature of digital spaces, where surveillance and online harassment pose serious threats. Despite these challenges, the activists stressed that internet access remains indispensable for maintaining momentum and coordinating resistance efforts.

Overall, the respondents agreed that while digital platforms cannot replace traditional protest methods, they serve as a powerful complement that amplifies revolutionary messages, builds solidarity, and sustains global attention. They underscored that internet access is not merely a technological privilege but a democratic necessity in the fight for freedom and justice. In their view, an informed and connected population stands a better chance of resisting authoritarian rule and fostering a more democratic society. Thus, understanding the perceptions of these key stakeholders highlights the undeniable influence of digital spaces in shaping the trajectory of Myanmar's Spring Revolution. The internet has become a vital revolutionary tool — a space where hope is sustained, voices are amplified, and the struggle for democracy continues despite relentless state repression.

Trust and credibility in fundraising

The sustainability of funding for the Spring Revolution relies heavily on diversified sources, both online and offline. Online campaigns, including crowdfunding, bidding platforms, YouTube monetization, applications, lucky draws, and lotteries, complement on-ground revenue generation through taxation, fees, NUG bonds, shares, and NUG initiative funds. However, the cornerstone of these efforts remains public donations. Public participation is indispensable, but it is influenced by trust, transparency, and the perceived accountability of fund management. This section examines the public and policymaker perspectives on funding the revolution, highlighting barriers to participation, the importance of credibility, and the challenges of ensuring sustainable funding strategies.

- **Public perception (linking public trust to funding):** Public sentiment on funding the revolution reveals a complex interplay of trust and credibility. The shift to online fundraising became a necessity after the State Administration Council (SAC) suppressed on-ground activities. Many individuals are willing to contribute financially, provided organizations demonstrate transparent and accountable use of funds. However, challenges persist, such as public impatience with security checks for donations and concerns over financial misuse.

The survey results reveal that 75% of respondents are not currently donating, and 72.5% do not use digital fundraising applications such as YouTube, Click-to-Donate platforms, or fundraising games. Additionally, 78.2% of respondents have never donated to the Spring Revolution through digital tools. Among those who do contribute, donation frequency varies significantly. 22.8% donate once or twice a year, while 18.6% donate three times annually. A smaller percentage contributes more frequently, with 9% donating four times a year, 6.2% five times, and 4.8% either six or ten times per year. Only 2.8% donate seven times annually, and 1.4% donate eleven or twelve times a year. These findings indicate limited engagement with digital fundraising tools and highlight the diverse donation patterns among supporters of the Spring Revolution.

Barriers to donating have not diminished participation entirely but have altered its form. Activism, which was once direct and visible, has transitioned to indirect methods due to increased security risks and economic hardship. Rising prices, unemployment, and the threat of severe penalties, including death, force individuals to prioritize personal survival. Security concerns such as the use of VPNs, lack of international banking channels, and risks associated with using personal bank accounts for donations further impede contributions.

Trust and public participation are fundamentally linked to the credibility and accountability of fundraising efforts. Transparency in fund allocation and usage strengthens public confidence, encouraging continued donations. Conversely, a lack of accountability fosters skepticism and hesitancy, deterring potential contributors. This dynamic underscores the critical need for organizations to uphold high standards of financial management and openly communicate their efforts.

- **Policymaker perception (balancing risks and ensuring sustainable funding):** The divergence of funding campaigns among the NUG, PDFs, LPDFs, and EROs illustrates a lack of cohesive strategy. Numerous online campaigns have emerged, employing varying approaches. For instance, campaigns associated with celebrities tend to attract more donations, as seen in the success of initiatives like "Click 2 Donate," which is celebrated for its transparency and credibility. Conversely, projects like "Fly Dragon" face allegations of financial mismanagement, undermining public trust.

EROs funding strategies often rely on pre-established networks, taxes, and fees, whereas the NUG and PDFs face greater challenges in securing sustainable income. A significant finding is the heavy reliance on volunteers for fundraising activities, particularly within the NUG. This reliance poses risks to long-term sustainability, as a lack of dedicated staff and institutional frameworks hinders the development of systematic and scalable fundraising operations.

In the 21st century, the digital age has profoundly reshaped societal norms, communication, and economic structures. This revolution extends to policy formulation and funding strategies, underscoring the potential of digital platforms as powerful tools for generating financial support. Embracing digital innovation is essential for addressing current challenges and ensuring the sustainability of revolutionary efforts. Policymakers and organizations must prioritize strategic planning, transparency, and capacity building to leverage the full potential of digital technologies and secure long-term financial stability.

SAC censorship

The advent of the digital space has created opportunities for both the revolutionaries and the State Administration Council (SAC) in Myanmar. While digital platforms have provided significant advantages to the revolution, such as facilitating fundraising, coordinating strikes, and disseminating real-time news, SAC has been equally determined to control and suppress this space to maintain its authority.

Unlike the nationwide internet shutdown implemented on the morning of February 1, 2021, SAC faces limitations in fully disrupting the internet, as businesses and corporations heavily rely on it. Instead, SAC employs a range of censorship techniques. Initially, they targeted Facebook, the most popular social media platform in Myanmar, with an outright ban. However, the public, already accustomed to using VPNs due to previous government restrictions during the COVID-19 period, circumvented these efforts. In response, SAC began implementing more sophisticated censorship measures, including firewalls that restrict internet access to whitelisted content. Consequently, Myanmar citizens are compelled to rely on advanced or paid VPN services to access platforms like Facebook and other social media.

Impact of VPN issue and cyber security law

According to a report by UK-based Top10VPN, Myanmar ranked second globally after Pakistan for economic losses due to internet shutdowns in 2024, incurring a loss of \$1.58 billion. Myanmar and Azerbaijan recorded the longest shutdown durations, each exceeding 8,700 hours. The most targeted platforms included X (formerly Twitter), TikTok, and Signal, reflecting a broader trend of governments restricting access to social media and communication tools.

As of January 1, 2025, SAC has implemented the Cyber Security Law, introducing strict penalties for violations. Individuals found guilty of unauthorized VPN establishment may face prison sentences ranging from a minimum of one month to a maximum of six months, along with fines between 1 million and 10 million Myanmar Kyats. Additionally, any evidence related to the offense will be confiscated as state property. For offenses related to cyber misuse, violators could be sentenced to imprisonment for a period of one to three years and fined between 5 million and 20 million Myanmar Kyats.

- **Public perception:** The SAC's restrictions on digital platforms have significantly impacted the public's ability to access information and express political opinions. According to survey results, approximately 80% of respondents reported needing to use VPNs to bypass SAC's limitations on Facebook and Messenger. This reliance on VPNs reflects the extent of censorship, as Facebook remains a vital platform for communication and political engagement in Myanmar. However, fear of surveillance has deterred many from sharing political opinions online, as SAC closely monitors social media through its network of informants and digital lobbies. These informants report individuals who post political content, resulting in threats or coercive measures to suppress dissent. Consequently, the digital space for revolutionary activities has become increasingly constrained.

Beyond social media, SAC has leveraged traditional media for propaganda purposes. Following the coup on February 1, 2021, SAC gained control of government-owned television channels, transforming them into tools for disseminating pro-military narratives. Survey data indicates that 75% of respondents experienced restrictions or propaganda on television channels. In stark contrast, the pre-coup era offered relatively open access to independent and diverse media, including both social media platforms and television channels. This shift underscores the narrowing of both digital and traditional spaces for public discourse and independent thought.

Moreover, SAC's control extends beyond digital platforms to physical intrusions into citizens' lives. 37.8% of respondents reported having their phones checked randomly by soldiers or police officers. These checks are not limited to ensuring compliance with digital restrictions; they also serve as tools of intimidation. If VPNs, revolutionary content, or evidence of anti-SAC activities are discovered, individuals face severe consequences. Many are detained, and some are only released after paying bribes. Those unable to afford such payments risk imprisonment. This practice has incentivized soldiers and police to conduct frequent and arbitrary phone inspections, turning censorship into an additional source of income for law enforcement.

The survey also reveals the pervasive nature of SAC's digital control, with nearly 80% of respondents stating they have encountered internet restrictions. This pervasive censorship highlights the SAC's efforts to stifle dissent not only online but also through physical and psychological means. These measures have cultivated an atmosphere of fear and distrust, curtailing the public's ability to organize, share information, or challenge the regime's authority.

- **Policy maker perception:** As the revolution in Myanmar heavily depends on digital tools for communication and coordination, various organizations and leaders have adopted platforms like Zoom for meetings and discussions. However, stakeholders express significant concerns regarding the security of these platforms. According to key informants (KII), they believe that tools like Zoom are not secure enough, as they can be easily interrupted or intercepted, which could lead to critical information leaks. Additionally, some reported having faced direct cyberattacks, including disruptions during Zoom meetings and threats via email.

To address these concerns, stakeholders encourage the use of more secure communication platforms. They recommend tools like Signal and Telegram, which are considered more resistant to surveillance and interception. These platforms provide end-to-end encryption, making them safer options for organizing and communicating within the revolution. By relying on these tools, the revolutionaries can minimize the risk of SAC infiltration and ensure the confidentiality of their communications.

Facebook plays a central role in the revolution, especially in organizing events, fundraising, and spreading messages. This platform has become a crucial tool for the revolutionaries to reach a wide audience and mobilize support. However, stakeholders acknowledge that the possibility of SAC banning Facebook in Myanmar poses a significant challenge to the movement. In light of this, they emphasize the importance of preparing alternative strategies. They urge revolutionaries to be proactive in developing contingency plans and ensuring they are ready to pivot to other platforms or communication methods if Facebook is blocked or restricted by the SAC.

While both sides—SAC and the revolution—use social media as a powerful tool for advancing their respective causes, policymakers stress the need for resilience and adaptability. Social media is an open space, but it is also a battleground where both sides can exploit its advantages. To counter SAC's attacks on digital platforms, policymakers suggest that revolutionaries must enhance their cybersecurity measures and remain vigilant against potential surveillance or cyberattacks. This preparation will be key in maintaining momentum and security throughout the struggle.

In conclusion, the SAC's efforts to control Myanmar's digital landscape have significantly impacted both the public and revolutionary movements. While the government has imposed stringent censorship measures, from blocking platforms like Facebook to conducting random phone checks, the public has continuously found ways to bypass these restrictions, often relying on VPNs and alternative communication tools. Key stakeholders have stressed the importance of security, urging the use of more secure platforms like Signal and Telegram to avoid SAC's surveillance. Despite these efforts, SAC has also attempted to leverage its own social media platform, similar to Russia's VK, to counter the growing influence of independent platforms. This battle for control over digital space continues to be a crucial aspect of the ongoing struggle in Myanmar, with both sides seeking to harness the power of the internet to further their respective agendas.

Digital rights and public awareness

Since the coup on February 1, 2021, the military has systematically blocked the use of social media platforms. They imposed unstable and restricted internet access to disrupt the dissemination of revolutionary messages to the public. Digital privacy has been severely compromised since the military takeover. People have not only lost their digital rights but also faced widespread human rights violations on the ground. Even a single word against the military could lead to arrest under Section 505 (Ka), a law often weaponized under the guise of “defamation.”

Public perception from survey results

Recent survey reveals that people are increasingly concerned about their digital privacy. The pervasive fear of surveillance has begun to suppress emotional responses against the military, leading to a noticeable decline in positive and supportive messages toward revolutionary groups, particularly among residents in local areas. According to survey results:

- Approximately 88% of respondents expressed significant concern about their digital privacy due to fear of military surveillance.
- Nearly 45% of individuals reported taking measures such as changing social media passwords, locking their profiles, or updating personal contact information.
- Around 20% of respondents admitted they had not taken any actions, citing forgetfulness.

This highlights the growing fear associated with using digital platforms and the broader impact on freedom of speech. Despite these challenges, a mere 10% of respondents believe that digital platforms will continue to play a role in Myanmar’s political movement. This indicates that public engagement in the digital political movement is likely to decrease as the revolution prolongs.

Privacy intrusion and its impact

The intrusion into personal privacy began during the coup with internet shutdowns and restrictions on Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), which are essential for accessing platforms used for political expression. These measures persist today, particularly in stronghold revolutionary areas such as Karenni State and the central regions of Myanmar, where internet connectivity has been completely cut off.

In states like Karen and Shan, internet connections remain unstable, and the military has implemented strict control measures, including checkpoint inspections at every entry and exit including phone checks: gallery and social media searches. The military investigates phone galleries and social media accounts such as Viber, Facebook and Telegram to identify anti-military posts and evidence of support for revolutionary movements. Photos showing donations to refugees, organizations, or any activities related to the revolution are scrutinized. Moreover, a single word or post critical of the military can result in charges under defamation law or extortion for money under threat of illegal action.

These invasive practices have led to heightened privacy awareness among the public. People are locking their profiles, avoiding political expression on social media, and employing other precautions. However,

the participation in digital political movements has significantly declined, weakening the collective ability to organize and disseminate revolutionary messages.

Policymaker perception: As digital privacy violations and human rights abuses have increased, particularly for those living within the country, many people have started uninstalling VPNs to avoid trouble. To avoid phone inspections, many suggest using two phones; however, in reality, this is not feasible for lower income populations, according to a policymaker.

One key informant stated, “In our city, the military has imposed harsh measures such as banning motorcycles, conducting arbitrary searches, and even shooting individuals on sight-actions that effectively serve as immediate death sentences.” These severe tactics have instilled fear among the populace, resulting in a significant decrease in public participation in the revolution. Interestingly, one interviewee mentioned that public participation did not decrease, while the rest of the interviews indicated a clear decline.

In conclusion, the military’s targeted surveillance and privacy violations have impacted public trust in digital platforms and diminished the space for political expression. These measures not only suppress freedom of speech but also disrupt the revolutionary momentum by creating an atmosphere of fear and self-censorship. This has become one of the factors weakening the Spring Revolution.

Quantitative analysis

Demographic analysis of survey data

A total of 465 valid respondents participated in the online survey, comprising male (60.4%), female (37%), and LGBTQAI+ (2.6%). The majority of respondents have completed either high school (39.6%) or a university degree (35.9%), suggesting a solid educational background among the participants. Among eleven occupational categories, the majority of survey respondents are self-employed (27.1%), company employees (12.3%), and students (11.8%), while 13.5% are unemployed. The variety of occupations indicates that public opinions are not limited to a single occupational class, but rather encompass a range of diverse classes.

Analysis of household size reveals that households with three members account for 20.4%, those with four members for 22.8%, five members for 22.4%, and six members for 13.1%, collectively representing 78.7% of the respondents. In the survey, 41.3% of respondents indicated that there were no children under 18 years old in their households, while 23.9% reported having two children and 17.8% reported having three children. In terms of household income distribution, 33.1% of individuals earn between 2.5 and 4.9 lakhs (54-107 USD), 25.6% earn between 5 and 9 lakhs (109-196 USD), 6.7% earn between 10 and 14.9 lakhs (218-324 USD), and 5.6% earn 20 lakhs or more (435 USD and above). Additionally, 26.9% earn less than 2.5 lakhs (54 USD) per month. The monthly average exchange rate of the USD from the survey period (from Sep to Dec, 2024) is 4596MMK per USD. This study primarily includes single (58.1%) and married (36.6%) respondents.

Regarding geographical coverage, the majority of respondents are from Yangon (32.3%), followed by Mandalay (14.2%), Rakhine (9.9%), Shan (8.4%), and Irrawaddy (6.5%), with the remaining states and regions, each representing less than 5%. The majority of respondents are Bamar (54.4%), followed by Rakhine (11.4%), Shan (6.7%), and Mon (5.2%), with the remaining ethnic groups each comprising less than 5% of the total. Buddhism accounts for 70.1%, Islam for 18.1%, and Christianity for 9.5% of the total respondents from a religious perspective.

Therefore, the survey findings offer a detailed demographic analysis, emphasizing diversity across gender, education, occupation, household structure, income, and geographic location. The wide range of occupations provides diverse viewpoints, whereas household size and income distribution indicate socio-economic variation. Ethnic and religious representation corresponds with the demographic composition of Myanmar. The insights enhance the study's representativeness, ensuring its relevance in the analysis of public opinion and the understanding of broader societal trends across significant socio-economic and regional groups.

Empirical model results

According to the regression analysis, it reveals that the digital factors such as digital engagement, perception on political movements, trust and credibility in information, regulatory censorship, and awareness of digital rights and privacy are significantly influences on the public political engagement; participation on digital movements and activities, promoting awareness and sharing information about spring revolution, and contribution money and donations through digital platforms. Trust and credibility were found to be positively significant across all models (1. participation in digital movements and activities, 2. Promoting awareness and sharing information about the spring revolution, and 3. Contribution money and donations through digital platforms) which indicate that individuals who trust the digital sources are more likely to participate in online activism. Conversely, digital right and privacy awareness had a negative effect in all three models which refers to individuals concerned about their security safety which make them less likely to engage in online political movements. Moreover, regulatory censorship was positively associated with all three models, implying that the more digital restrictions on individuals, the more participation in public political engagement.

On the one hand, demographic factors which assume as control variables in this regression analysis model such as gender, location, ethnicity, religion, income, and marital status were found to be statistically insignificant across all models, which means that these demographic characteristics do not play crucial roles in predicting impact on digital participation. This was proven that public political activism is driven more by individual perceptions and digital space factors rather than demographic impact. Moreover, economic factors such as income and occupation were also non-significant factors indicating that participation in digital political activism was not influenced by the financial status significantly.

Interestingly, another observation that we found in analytical output was that the number of children under 18 in a household was found as positively significant across all models, indicating that individuals with more dependents are more willing to contribute to digital movements. This can be because they are worrying about their generation who can have the impact of political issues for their future. To conclude that the digital space factors such as trust and credibility, regulatory censorship are playing the primary role which drive the participation in digital movements and activities, whereas demographic and economic factors are not taking as a significant role to be highlighted.

Changing political participation in digital movements

Participation in political digital movements and activities is characterized by the frequency of engagement in online political activities, which include commenting, sharing posts, joining events, participating in campaigns, signing petitions, attending virtual protests, donating, engaging in forums, creating political content, and publishing blogs.

Multiple regression analysis for participation in digital movements and activities

In this section, Participation on Digital Movements and Activities acts as the dependent variable (y_1), representing the engagement in online political activities of individuals including commenting on social media platforms, sharing political content, joining online events, participating in protests, signing petitions and engaging in online discussions. These all activities reflect digital political participation and we aforementioned activities portray digital political participation, and we examined how digital political participation is impacted by various digital spaces and tools by using the multiple linear regression method.

The model is:

$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1x_1 + \beta_2x_2 + \beta_3x_3 + \beta_4x_4 + \beta_5x_5 + \dots + \beta_{16}x_{16} + \varepsilon$$

Where, y = Participation on Digital Movements and Activities, β_0 = intercept, β_i = coefficients, x_1 = Digital Engagement, x_2 = Perception of Political Movement, x_3 = Trust and Credibility, x_4 = Regulatory Censorship, x_5 = Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness, x_6 = Age, x_7 = Gender, x_8 = Education, x_9 = Occupation, x_{10} = Marital Status, x_{11} = Location, x_{12} = Household Size, x_{13} = Ethnicity, x_{14} = Religion, x_{15} = Number of Children Under 18, x_{16} = Income, ε = Error Term

TABLE 1. INTERPRETATION OF PARTICIPATION ON DIGITAL MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES (y_1)

X Variables		Y Variables	Correlation	
If 1 unit increase in	Digital Engagement	Participation in digital movement and activities will be	Decrease 0.258 units ($p < 0.001$)	Negative
	Perception of Political Movement		Decreases 0.019 units ($p = 0.561$)	Not observed
	Trust and Credibility		Increase 0.575 units ($p < 0.001$)	Positive
	Regulatory Censorship		Increase 0.187 units ($p < 0.002$)	Positive
	Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness		Decrease 0.153 units ($p < 0.001$)	Negative

Digital Engagement (x1): On average, one-unit increase in Digital Engagement, quantified by the utilization of digital sources to understand Myanmar's current situation, results in a decrease in Participation in Political Digital Movements and Activities by 0.258 units ($p < 0.001$). The negative correlation indicates that engagement with digital information does not inherently lead to active involvement in digital movements. A potential explanation is digital fatigue, in which excessive exposure to information results in disengagement instead of activism (Morozov, 2011). Furthermore, passive news consumption may lead to slacktivism, wherein individuals perceive themselves as informed yet fail to engage in action (Christensen, 2011). The political environment in Myanmar, characterized by stringent censorship and surveillance of digital platforms, may inhibit individuals from participating in online activism (Howard et al., 2011).

Perception of Political Movement (x2): The perception of political movements on social media depicts no significant correlation with engagement in digital political activities. A one-unit increase in altering one's political stance due to digital content corresponds to an average change of 0.019 units in participation ($p = 0.561$), which is negligible. The statistically insignificant relationship indicates that changing political views due to social media exposure does not inherently lead to increased or decreased participation in online activism. The absence of statistical significance ($p > 0.05$) suggests that changes in digital political participation cannot be confidently linked to alterations in political stance, potentially due to unmeasured confounding variables. A key factor is that although individuals may come across persuasive political content online, their participation in digital activism is influenced by other considerations, including perceived efficacy, social influences, and offline political constraints (Boulianne, 2015). The small coefficient indicates that, should an association exist, its practical significance would be negligible. This finding is consistent with previous research that emphasizes the intricate and frequently indirect mechanisms by which digital political exposure influences political engagement (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2018).


Trust and Credibility (x3): On average, one-unit increase in Trust and Credibility, encompassing trust in information sources, reduced exposure to misinformation, and changes in political stance influenced by social media content, correlates with a 0.575 unit increase in Participation in Political Digital Movements and Activities ($p < 0.001$). The robust positive correlation suggests that trust in credible digital content substantially influences political engagement. Individuals who place greater trust in alternative media sources compared to state-controlled narratives are more inclined to act on the information they receive (Metzger et al., 2003). In contrast, exposure to misinformation and skepticism towards online sources may result in political apathy or disengagement (Tandoc et al., 2018). In Myanmar, the suppression of independent news organizations significantly impacts access to reliable information, which is essential for sustaining digital activism.

Regulatory Censorship (x4): On average, one-unit increase in Regulatory Censorship, characterized by restrictions such as VPN bans, internet shutdowns, and social media monitoring, correlates with a 0.187 unit increase in Participation in Political Digital Movements and Activities ($p = 0.003$). This unexpected positive correlation indicates that censorship efforts may provoke resistance instead of stifling activism. This can be when censorship increases, people will try to resist the restrictions of digital movements and will be more likely to participate in it. Historically, digital repression has resulted in increased mobilization, exemplified by Myanmar's use of alternative platforms such as Telegram and Viber to circumvent

ensorship (Gohdes, 2020). Excessive repression, including total internet shutdowns, may ultimately hinder engagement (Deibert et al., 2010).

Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness (x5): On average, one-unit increase in Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness, encompassing concerns related to cybersecurity, personal data protection, and digital safety measures, results in a decrease of 0.153 units in Participation in Political Digital Movements and Activities ($p < 0.001$). This negative association indicates that individuals with heightened awareness of digital surveillance risks may engage in self-censorship regarding their political activities online. The military regime in Myanmar has employed cybersecurity legislation to detain activists, fostering a climate of fear (Zuboff, 2019). As a result, many individuals opt to minimize their online presence instead of participating in high-risk activism, despite heightened digital awareness.

FIGURE 2: THE ROLE OF DIGITAL FACTORS ON THE ONLINE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION



The findings illustrate the complex relationships among digital engagement, trust in information, regulatory censorship, political perception, and participation in digital political movements. Figure (2) highlights the findings on the changing Political Participation in Digital Movements in Myanmar. Trust in credible sources is essential for promoting digital activism; however, simple exposure to political content does not guarantee active participation, frequently resulting from passive consumption and digital fatigue. Regulatory censorship may inadvertently stimulate resistance instead of deterring activism, although severe repression ultimately limits participation. The perception of political movements on social media does not significantly affect engagement in digital activism, indicating that altering political views through online exposure alone is inadequate to stimulate action. This underscores the significance of external factors including offline mobilization, social networks, and political constraints. Furthermore, increased awareness of digital rights and privacy leads to self-censorship, thereby reinforcing the chilling effects of surveillance. The findings highlight the necessity for independent journalism, secure digital environments, and coordinated offline strategies to maintain political engagement in repressive contexts.

Promotion and dissemination of information about the Spring Revolution

Promoting awareness and sharing information about the Spring Revolution (y_2) refers to the degree to which individuals engage in the dissemination of political content, participate in online discussions, and partake in digital activism associated with the Spring Revolution. This includes activities such as commenting, sharing posts, joining events, signing petitions, and other online engagements. We used the multiple linear regression to observe the impact on promoting awareness and sharing information about the Spring revolution following the same set of independent variables—Digital spaces and tools.

Multiple regression analysis for promoting awareness and sharing information about Spring Revolution

The model is:

$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1x_1 + \beta_2x_2 + \beta_3x_3 + \beta_4x_4 + \beta_5x_5 + \dots + \beta_{16}x_{16} + \varepsilon$$

Where,

y = Promoting Awareness and Sharing Information about Spring Revolution, β_0 = intercept, β_i = coefficients, x_1 = Digital Engagement, x_2 = Perception of Political Movement, x_3 = Trust and Credibility, x_4 = Regulatory Censorship, x_5 = Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness, x_6 = Age, x_7 = Gender, x_8 = Education, x_9 = Occupation, x_{10} = Marital Status, x_{11} = Location, x_{12} = Household Size, x_{13} = Ethnicity, x_{14} = Religion, x_{15} = Number of Children Under 18, x_{16} = Income, ε = Error Term

TABLE 2. INTERPRETATION OF PROMOTING AWARENESS AND SHARING INFORMATION ABOUT SPRING REVOLUTION (y_2)

X Variables		Y Variables	Unit	Correlation
If 1 unit increase in	Digital Engagement	Promoting awareness and sharing information about Spring Revolution will be	Decrease 0.292 ($p < 0.001$)	Negative
	Perception of Political Movement		Decrease 0.046 ($p = 0.104$)	Not observed
	Trust and Credibility		Increase 0.492 ($p < 0.001$)	Positive
	Regulatory Censorship		Increase 0.185 ($p < 0.001$)	Positive
	Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness		Decrease 0.117 ($p < 0.001$)	Negative

Digital Engagement (x1): On average, one-unit increase in Digital Engagement results in a decrease of 0.292 units in Promoting Awareness and Sharing Information about the Spring Revolution ($p < 0.001$). This negative relationship indicates that although individuals may actively pursue political information online, such engagement does not inherently lead to participation in sharing information or enhancing awareness. The overconsumption of information without active dissemination may result from information fatigue, wherein excessive digital exposure causes disengagement instead of activism (Pentina & Tarafdar, 2014). Furthermore, concerns regarding surveillance and potential government retaliation may inhibit individuals from openly disseminating political content, especially in authoritarian environments such as Myanmar (Howard & Hussain, 2013).


Perception of Political Movement (x2): It does not have a significant association with the promotion of awareness and the dissemination of information regarding the Spring Revolution. A one-unit increase in the alteration of political stance attributable to digital content corresponds to an average decrease of 0.046 units in engagement ($p = 0.104$). The statistically insignificant relationship indicates that changes in political views due to social media exposure do not inherently lead to increased or decreased participation in digital activism associated with the Spring Revolution. The absence of statistical significance ($p > 0.05$) suggests that variations in political stance do not serve as a dependable predictor of participation in online political discussions or activism. A notable factor is that although individuals may recognize the impact of digital content, their genuine engagement is influenced by external limitations, including fear of repression, political apathy, or a perceived ineffectiveness of digital activism (Tufekci, 2017). The small coefficient indicates that, even if an association were present, its practical effect on participation would be negligible. This finding is consistent with previous research highlighting the complex and frequently indirect impacts of digital political exposure on activism (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013).

Trust and Credibility (x3): On average, one-unit increase in Trust and Credibility correlates with a 0.492 unit increase in Promoting Awareness and Sharing Information about the Spring Revolution ($p < 0.001$). The strong positive correlation suggests that increased trust in information correlates with a heightened willingness to share and promote awareness of political issues. Confidence in sharing information is enhanced by trust in credible, independent news sources, mitigating concerns regarding misinformation backlash (Metzger et al., 2003). In Myanmar, the dominance of state-controlled media leads to an increased reliance on independent journalism and social media influencers, thereby enhancing engagement in political discourse (Tandoc et al., 2018).

Regulatory Censorship (x4): On average, one-unit increase in Regulatory Censorship correlates with a 0.185 unit increase in Promoting Awareness and Sharing Information about the Spring Revolution ($p = 0.003$). The observed relationship indicates that increased censorship may elicit resistance, prompting individuals to disseminate more content as a countermeasure to suppression. Previous studies on digital repression demonstrate that restrictive measures may provoke backlash activism, prompting individuals to pursue alternative methods for information dissemination (Gohdes, 2020). Extreme censorship, such as total internet shutdowns, may ultimately hinder digital activism (Deibert et al., 2010).

Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness (x5): On average, one-unit increase in Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness results in a decrease of 0.117 units in Promoting Awareness and Sharing Information about the Spring Revolution ($p < 0.001$). This inverse correlation indicates that individuals with heightened awareness of digital security risks tend to be less inclined to share political information online. In environments characterized by extensive surveillance, digital literacy may result in self-censorship, as individuals adopt measures to evade tracking by authorities (Zuboff, 2019). Although security measures enable activists, the fear of prosecution or retaliation frequently inhibits open participation in digital movements (Howard & Hussain, 2013).

FIGURE 3: DIGITAL ENGAGEMENT AND ACTIVISM IN THE SPRING REVOLUTION



The findings display the complex interactions among digital engagement, trust in information, regulatory censorship, and political awareness related to the Spring Revolution, as depicted in Figure (3). Trust in credible sources bolsters activism; however, digital engagement frequently results in passive consumption instead of active participation. Regulatory censorship may provoke resistance; however, excessive repression constraints participation. The influence of political movements on social media does not significantly affect activism, suggesting that merely altering political views is inadequate for prompting action. Moreover, increased awareness of digital surveillance promotes self-censorship. The findings highlight the importance of independent journalism, secure digital platforms, and approaches to maintain political discourse in repressive contexts. The apprehension surrounding surveillance and cybersecurity significantly reduces participation, despite increased digital literacy.

Contribution money and donations through digital platforms

In this study, Contribution Money and Donations through Digital Platforms was taken as the dependent variable, while digital space factors such as digital engagement, perceptions of political movements, trust and credibility, regulatory censorship, awareness of digital rights and privacy and demographic data were served as independent variables. Direct monetary contributions, participation in fundraising campaigns, and indirect contribution to the revolution funds by playing revolution games or watching revolution YouTube channels or Click2Donate will be included as the factors of dependent variables.

Multiple regression analysis for contribution money and donations through digital platforms

The model is:

$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1x_1 + \beta_2x_2 + \beta_3x_3 + \beta_4x_4 + \beta_5x_5 + \dots + \beta_{16}x_{16} + \varepsilon$$

Where,

y = Contribution Money and Donations through Digital Platforms, β_0 = intercept, β_i = coefficients, x_1 = Digital Engagement, x_2 = Perception of Political Movement, x_3 = Trust and Credibility, x_4 = Regulatory Censorship, x_5 = Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness, x_6 = Age, x_7 = Gender, x_8 = Education, x_9 = Occupation, x_{10} = Marital Status, x_{11} = Location, x_{12} = Household Size, x_{13} = Ethnicity, x_{14} = Religion, x_{15} = Number of Children Under 18, x_{16} = Income

TABLE 3. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRIBUTION MONEY AND DONATIONS THROUGH DIGITAL PLATFORMS (Y3)

X Variables		Y Variables	Unit	Correlation
If 1 unit increase in	Digital Engagement	Contribution Money and Donations through Digital Platforms will be	Decrease 0.352 ($p < 0.001$)	Negative
	Perception of Political Movement		Decrease 0.108 ($p < 0.002$)	Negative
	Trust and Credibility		Increase 0.582 ($p < 0.001$)	Positive
	Regulatory Censorship		Increase 0.163 ($p < 0.009$)	Positive
	Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness		Decrease 0.117 ($p < 0.001$)	Negative

A negative correlation ($p < 0.001$) exists between digital engagement (x_1) and financial contributions, where a 1-unit increase in digital engagement predicts a 0.352-unit decrease in donations, likely due to slacktivism, preference for symbolic support, distrust in digital fundraising, economic constraints, and perceived collective action.

A negative correlation ($p < 0.002$) between perception of political movements (x_2) and financial contributions (-0.108 units) suggests that stronger belief in digital activism reduces donations, likely due to preference for symbolic participation, resource allocation to direct engagement, skepticism about digital fundraising, and assumption that others will donate.

A positive correlation ($p < 0.001$) between trust and credibility (x_3) in information and financial contributions (+0.582 units) suggests that greater credibility enhances confidence in fund allocation, reduces fraud concerns, strengthens commitment, boosts social influence, and increases perceived donation impact.

A positive correlation ($p < 0.009$) between regulatory censorship (x_4) and financial contributions (+0.163 units) suggests that increased repression drives resistance, urgency to support movements, reliance on donations over direct activism, trust in secure platforms, and collective mobilization.

A 1-unit increase in digital rights and privacy awareness (x_5) leading to a 0.117-unit increase in financial contributions ($p < 0.001$) suggests that greater awareness of surveillance risks encourages support for secure activism, enhances trust in safe donation platforms, motivates funding for digital rights protection, and fosters collective action to counter digital repression.

FIGURE 4: FACTORS AFFECTING FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SPRING REVOLUTION

Should I contribute financially to the Spring Revolution through digital platforms?




In conclusion, the analysis reveals that digital engagement, perception of political movements, trust in information, regulatory censorship, and digital rights awareness all play significant roles in influencing financial contributions through digital platforms. Increased digital engagement and perception of political movements generally reduce donations, likely due to slacktivism, symbolic participation, and concerns about surveillance. Conversely, trust and credibility in information sources and heightened digital rights and privacy awareness positively influence donations, as they enhance confidence in the impact of contributions and the security of platforms. Additionally, regulatory censorship increases financial contributions, possibly driven by a desire to resist repression and support restricted movements. These findings highlight how both psychological factors and external conditions shape individuals' willingness to contribute financially to digital causes.

Challenges and opportunities of digital spaces and tools

Digital engagement and participation risks

Participation in political movements and activities carries significant security risks, especially for younger individuals, as 70% of respondents are under 35 and aware of the dangers associated with digital activism. The survey results indicate a negative correlation between engagement and risk perception—people remain politically engaged but are increasingly cautious. As a result, political event organizers must carefully assess security threats posed by the SAC when designing online and offline political movements.


FIGURE 5: FUTURE EXPECTATIONS OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS (FACEBOOK) IN SHAPING POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN MYANMAR



Public perception of political movements

While digital platforms provide space for political discourse, perceived risks and diffused responsibility often hinder active participation. The tendency to assume others will take action reduces individual engagement, reinforcing the need for more inclusive and strategic digital mobilization efforts.

FIGURE 6: FUTURE EXPECTATIONS OF VIRTUAL TOWN HALLS AND COMMUNITY MEETINGS IN SHAPING POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN MYANMAR




Trust and credibility in digital activism

Building trust in credible, independent media and verified digital platforms is essential not only for ensuring public access to accurate information but also for effective fundraising. The findings suggest that trust and credibility are strongly correlated with individuals’ willingness to share political content. To counter misinformation and foster greater public engagement, the NUG, NUCC, and EROs must prioritize:

- Establishing reliable media partnerships and avoiding repetitive messaging across various ministry Facebook pages.
- Implementing consistent communication strategies to boost public confidence in digital activism.

Additionally, to build trust for raising various forms of funding, it will be critical to focus on accountability and transparency while carefully considering potential risks in the future.


FIGURE 7: FUTURE EXPECTATIONS OF CROWDFUNDING AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL CAUSES IN SHAPING POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN MYANMAR



Regulatory censorship and digital resistance

The survey findings reveal a paradox in the SAC’s internet censorship: the more the regime imposes digital restrictions, the stronger the public’s resolve to engage in political movements. This is reflected in the Spring Revolution’s slogan, *“Hti Yin Cha Mal, Phi Yin Kywa Mal”* (*“If you fight, we will fight back; if you oppress, we will revolt”*).

FIGURE 8: FUTURE EXPECTATIONS OF PROVIDING INTERNET (STARLINK) IN THE CONFLICT AREA IN SHAPING POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN MYANMAR




Revolutionary forces must prioritize sustainable digital access to empower public participation, despite ongoing censorship. Rather than focusing on the sheer volume of participants, attention should be given to the targeted groups that are more willing and active on digital platforms. Additionally, regular efforts to raise awareness about ways to bypass SAC censorship will be crucial to maintaining engagement.

Digital rights, privacy, and public awareness

Concerns over digital surveillance and online security risks significantly impact participation. As awareness of digital risks increases, individuals become more cautious about engaging in political activities online. To address these challenges:

- Revolutionary forces must develop strategies that minimize public risk while maintaining activism.
- People must be equipped with digital security awareness to safely navigate political movements online.

FIGURE 9: FUTURE EXPECTATIONS OF SOCIAL MEDIA ADVOCACY AND AWARENESS CAMPAIGNS IN SHAPING POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN MYANMAR



Policy recommendations for effective digital platforms

The following steps will strengthen trust, security, and participation, ensuring more effective and sustainable digital activism.

- 1. Strengthen organizational capacity:** NUG should transition key fundraising bodies like MOPFI from voluntary-based to paid staff for greater professionalism, accountability, and efficiency.
- 2. Refine fundraising strategies:** While NUG's diverse fundraising collaborations with organizations, celebrities, and activists work short-term, adopting secure digital fundraising methods is essential to counter skepticism and build trust.
- 3. Ensure sustainable revenue:** NUG's reliance on public donations is unsustainable. A long-term revenue strategy, including effective taxation training for local administrations in controlled areas, is necessary.
- 4. Build trust & credibility:** Public concerns over credibility and accountability must be addressed. NUG should engage with trusted media rather than independent or biased sources to enhance transparency.
- 5. Promote inclusive participation:** Online discussions by NUG, NUCC, and EROs often exclude those suffering on the ground. Meaningful public participation in digital platforms is crucial for awareness and engagement.
- 6. Enhance digital security awareness:** Revolution forces and activists must assess digital risks and educate the public on safety measures before launching activities to maximize impact while minimizing harm.

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Appendix: Statistical data

This appendix presents the complete statistical output of the regression and ANOVA analysis, which support the findings in the main report according to the predictors of public political engagement. The tables and results provide a detailed look into the relationships between the variables.

The Model Summary and ANOVA table provide an overview of how predictors explain changes in political engagement, indicating the overall fit and significance of the regression model. The Coefficients table explains how each factor contributes to public political engagement, whether the effect is positive, negative or significant. The Collinearity Diagnostics ensures that our regression estimates are stable. The remaining statistics, such as residual statistics, support the assumption of normality and model reliability.

Overall, this appendix aims to provide a full view of our analysis behind the findings and support the reliability of our conclusions.

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.653 ^a	.427	.406	.30422	1.857

a. Predictors: (Constant), Income, Age, Occupation, Location, Ethnicity, Regulatory Censorship, Gender, Householdsize, Perception on Political Movement, MaritalStatus, Digital Engagement, Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness, Religion, Education, Trust and Credibility, Numberofchildrenunder18



b. Dependent Variable: Participation on Digital Movement and Activities

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	30.850	16	1.928	20.833	<.001 ^b
	Residual	41.463	448	.093		
	Total	72.313	464			

a. Dependent Variable: Participation on Digital Movement and Activities

b. Predictors: (Constant), Income, Age, Occupation, Location, Ethnicity, Regulatory Censorship, Gender, Householdsize, Perception on Political Movement, MaritalStatus, Digital Engagement, Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness, Religion, Education, Trust and Credibility, Numberofchildrenunder18



Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.661 ^a	.436	.416	.26456	1.893

a. Predictors: (Constant), Income, Age, Occupation, Location, Ethnicity, Regulatory Censorship, Gender, Householdsize, Perception on Political Movement, MaritalStatus, Digital Engagement, Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness, Religion, Education, Trust and Credibility, Numberofchildrenunder18

b. Dependent Variable: Promoting Awareness and Sharing Information about Spring Revolution

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	24.285	16	1.518	21.685	<.001 ^b
	Residual	31.357	448	.070		
	Total	55.642	464			

a. Dependent Variable: Promoting Awareness and Sharing Information about Spring Revolution

b. Predictors: (Constant), Income, Age, Occupation, Location, Ethnicity, Regulatory Censorship, Gender, Householdsize, Perception on Political Movement, MaritalStatus, Digital Engagement, Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness, Religion, Education, Trust and Credibility, Numberofchildrenunder18

Coefficients^a



Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B		Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	.355	.122		2.913	.004	.115	.594		
	Digital Engagement	-.292	.044	-.259	-6.612	<.001	-.379	-.205	.818	1.222
	Perception on Political Movement	-.046	.028	-.063	-1.628	.104	-.101	.010	.828	1.208
	Trust and Credibility	.492	.075	.260	6.543	<.001	.344	.640	.796	1.257
	Regulatory Censorship	.185	.051	.137	3.620	<.001	.085	.285	.874	1.144
	Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness	-.117	.018	-.259	-6.574	<.001	-.151	-.082	.813	1.230
	Age	-.003	.001	-.102	-2.656	.008	-.005	-.001	.853	1.172
	Gender	-.026	.023	-.041	-1.112	.267	-.072	.020	.928	1.078
	Education	-.005	.006	-.032	-.798	.425	-.017	.007	.796	1.256
	Occupation	-.005	.004	-.050	-1.364	.173	-.013	.002	.948	1.055
	MaritalStatus	.035	.021	.064	1.712	.088	-.005	.076	.899	1.113
	Location	-.002	.004	-.018	-.481	.631	-.011	.006	.943	1.061
	Householdsize	.002	.008	.009	.214	.830	-.014	.017	.766	1.305
	Ethnicity	.004	.008	.017	.469	.639	-.011	.018	.916	1.092
	Religion	.015	.014	.041	1.078	.282	-.012	.042	.849	1.178
	Numberofchildrenunder18	.026	.010	.112	2.592	.010	.006	.046	.673	1.487
	Income	.009	.010	.034	.892	.373	-.011	.029	.860	1.162

a. Dependent Variable: Promoting Awareness and Sharing Information about Spring Revolution

Collinearity Diagnostics^a

Model	Dimension	Eigenvalue	Variance Proportions																	
			Condition Index	(Constant)	Digital Engagement	Perception on Political Movement	Trust and Credibility	Regulatory Censorship	Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness	Age	Gender	Education	Occupation	MaritalStatus	Location	Householdsize	Ethnicity	Religion	Numberofchildrenunder18	Income
1	1	14.030	1.000	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
	2	.533	5.132	.00	.00	.19	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.11	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
	3	.427	5.732	.00	.28	.00	.03	.00	.04	.00	.00	.06	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
	4	.309	6.739	.00	.02	.02	.00	.00	.01	.00	.00	.13	.46	.01	.00	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00
	5	.245	7.571	.00	.00	.44	.03	.00	.01	.01	.00	.05	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01	.00	.00	.00
	6	.219	8.008	.00	.01	.09	.00	.00	.01	.00	.02	.01	.28	.00	.00	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00
	7	.200	8.373	.00	.19	.01	.03	.00	.03	.00	.03	.24	.12	.02	.04	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
	8	.182	8.773	.00	.01	.16	.12	.00	.01	.07	.03	.01	.01	.02	.00	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00
	9	.160	9.364	.00	.35	.00	.16	.00	.30	.00	.02	.21	.00	.00	.01	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00
	10	.143	9.921	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.08	.10	.14	.11	.00	.19	.01	.03	.01	.00	.00	.00
	11	.114	11.099	.00	.03	.02	.12	.06	.20	.00	.06	.00	.00	.10	.27	.07	.01	.00	.00	.00
	12	.108	11.398	.00	.00	.01	.08	.00	.01	.02	.43	.00	.02	.13	.16	.05	.07	.00	.00	.00
	13	.096	12.070	.00	.04	.01	.09	.09	.13	.49	.01	.06	.02	.18	.00	.02	.00	.00	.00	.00
	14	.080	13.213	.00	.01	.03	.01	.26	.03	.00	.12	.00	.00	.12	.15	.42	.01	.00	.00	.00
	15	.075	13.641	.00	.00	.00	.07	.00	.00	.00	.05	.00	.00	.07	.20	.02	.89	.06	.04	.00
	16	.070	14.154	.00	.02	.00	.21	.40	.01	.12	.00	.03	.00	.01	.05	.29	.11	.01	.18	.00
	17	.009	39.987	1.00	.04	.01	.03	.16	.11	.16	.08	.02	.02	.13	.11	.02	.10	.01	.06	.00

a. Dependent Variable: Promoting Awareness and Sharing Information about Spring Revolution



Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.634 ^a	.402	.381	.32210	1.849

a. Predictors: (Constant), Income, Age, Occupation, Location, Ethnicity, Regulatory Censorship, Gender, Householdsize, Perception on Political Movement, MaritalStatus, Digital Engagement, Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness, Religion, Education, Trust and Credibility, Numberofchildrenunder18

b. Dependent Variable: Contribution money and donations through digital platforms

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	31.305	16	1.957	18.859	<.001 ^b
	Residual	46.479	448	.104		
	Total	77.784	464			

a. Dependent Variable: Contribution money and donations through digital platforms

b. Predictors: (Constant), Income, Age, Occupation, Location, Ethnicity, Regulatory Censorship, Gender, Householdsize, Perception on Political Movement, MaritalStatus, Digital Engagement, Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness, Religion, Education, Trust and Credibility, Numberofchildrenunder18

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B		Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	.526	.148		3.547	<.001	.235	.818		
	Digital Engagement	-.352	.054	-.265	-6.557	<.001	-.458	-.247	.818	1.222
	Perception on Political Movement	-.108	.034	-.126	-3.135	.002	-.175	-.040	.828	1.208
	Trust and Credibility	.582	.092	.260	6.350	<.001	.402	.762	.796	1.257
	Regulatory Censorship	.163	.062	.102	2.620	.009	.041	.285	.874	1.144
	Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness	-.117	.022	-.219	-5.403	<.001	-.159	-.074	.813	1.230
	Age	-.005	.001	-.153	-3.868	<.001	-.008	-.003	.853	1.172
	Gender	.018	.029	.024	.621	.535	-.038	.074	.928	1.078
	Education	.004	.008	.021	.504	.614	-.011	.019	.796	1.256
	Occupation	-.004	.005	-.030	-.807	.420	-.013	.005	.948	1.055
	MaritalStatus	.008	.025	.012	.319	.750	-.041	.057	.899	1.113
	Location	-.005	.005	-.035	-.928	.354	-.015	.006	.943	1.061
	Householdsize	-.003	.010	-.012	-.292	.770	-.022	.016	.766	1.305
	Ethnicity	-.013	.009	-.055	-1.434	.152	-.031	.005	.916	1.092
	Religion	.003	.017	.008	.192	.848	-.030	.036	.849	1.178
	Numberofchildrenunder18	.047	.012	.170	3.809	<.001	.023	.071	.673	1.487
	Income	.012	.012	.038	.966	.335	-.012	.036	.860	1.162

a. Dependent Variable: Contribution money and donations through digital platforms

Collinearity Diagnostics^a

Model	Dimension	Eigenvalue	Variance Proportions																		
			Condition Index	(Constant)	Digital Engagement	Perception on Political Movement	Trust and Credibility	Regulatory Censorship	Digital Rights and Privacy Awareness	Age	Gender	Education	Occupation	Marital Status	Location	Household size	Ethnicity	Religion	Number of children under 18	Income	
1	1	14.030	1.000	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
	2	.533	5.132	.00	.00	.19	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.11	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.03	.95	.04
	3	.427	5.732	.00	.28	.00	.03	.00	.04	.00	.00	.00	.06	.00	.00	.00	.00	.08	.00	.00	.00
	4	.309	6.739	.00	.02	.02	.00	.00	.01	.00	.00	.13	.46	.01	.00	.01	.00	.00	.06	.04	.00
	5	.245	7.571	.00	.00	.44	.03	.00	.01	.01	.00	.05	.00	.00	.00	.05	.00	.01	.18	.03	.00
	6	.219	8.008	.00	.01	.09	.00	.00	.01	.00	.02	.01	.28	.00	.00	.01	.00	.47	.11	.01	.00
	7	.200	8.373	.00	.19	.01	.03	.02	.03	.00	.03	.24	.12	.02	.04	.00	.00	.26	.00	.01	.00
	8	.182	8.773	.00	.01	.16	.12	.00	.01	.07	.03	.01	.01	.02	.00	.01	.00	.01	.02	.48	.00
	9	.160	9.364	.00	.35	.00	.16	.00	.30	.00	.02	.21	.00	.00	.01	.01	.00	.01	.00	.06	.00
	10	.143	9.921	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.08	.10	.14	.11	.00	.19	.01	.03	.01	.03	.01	.24	.00
	11	.114	11.099	.00	.03	.02	.12	.95	.20	.00	.96	.00	.00	.10	.27	.07	.01	.01	.08	.03	.00
	12	.108	11.398	.00	.00	.01	.08	.00	.01	.02	.43	.00	.02	.13	.16	.05	.07	.00	.06	.01	.00
	13	.096	12.070	.00	.04	.01	.09	.99	.13	.49	.01	.06	.02	.18	.00	.02	.00	.01	.02	.00	.00
	14	.080	13.213	.00	.01	.03	.01	.26	.03	.00	.12	.00	.00	.12	.15	.42	.01	.00	.12	.00	.00
	15	.075	13.641	.00	.00	.00	.07	.00	.00	.00	.05	.00	.00	.07	.20	.02	.69	.06	.04	.02	.00
	16	.070	14.154	.00	.02	.00	.21	.40	.01	.12	.00	.03	.00	.01	.05	.29	.11	.01	.18	.00	.00
	17	.009	39.987	1.00	.04	.01	.03	.16	.11	.16	.08	.02	.02	.13	.11	.02	.10	.01	.06	.02	.00


a. Dependent Variable: Contribution money and donations through digital platforms

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-.2904	.9326	.3527	.25975	465
Residual	-.74776	.95089	.00000	.31650	465
Std. Predicted Value	-2.476	2.232	.000	1.000	465
Std. Residual	-2.322	2.952	.000	.983	465

a. Dependent Variable: Contribution money and donations through digital platforms

Histogram



Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual

